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floods, earthquakes, storm, tsunamis and wind.5 The model 
estimates the number of people at risk of being displaced by 
these events. Combined with IDMC’s work on the economic 
impacts of internal displacement, this information can help 
assess the resulting fiscal burden for national governments.
Disasters are associated with nearly two thirds of the new 
internal displacements recorded in 2017, the remaining third 
being associated with conflict and violence.6 There is no esti-
mated number of displacements in the contexts of climate 
change, environmental degradation and other triggers, and 
the only displacement risk estimates in use relate to sudden 
onset disasters.
Probabilistic models such as IDMC’s can help evaluate how 
likely a natural hazard is to occur, and how likely it is to lead 
to internal displacement.7 These models take into account 
the intensity of the hazard to estimate the scale of the asso-
ciated displacement, from two people displaced by a storm in 
Namibia to more than two million displaced by a hurricane, as 
happened when Hurricane Irma hit the Caribbean in August 
and September 2017.  
The economic consequences of these displacements have never 
been comprehensively assessed. The subsequent reduction in 
consumption, diminution of tax collection, lost production and 
the costs of providing care to people whose health has been 
affected can be a significant share of a country’s GDP and 
jeopardise the progress of socioeconomic development.8 The 
economic impacts of internal displacement should therefore be 
considered a contingent liability for governments and should 
be part of the public budget planning process.
table 1: Government liabilities: the fiscal risk matrix.9 
Liabilities Direct: 
Obligation in 
any event
Contingent:
Obligation if a particular 
event occurs
Explicit: 
government 
liability recog-
nised by law or 
contract
Foreign and 
domestic sover-
eign borrowing
Expenditures by 
budget law 
State guarantees for 
non-sovereign borrowing 
and public and private 
sector entities
Reconstruction of public 
assets
Implicit: obli-
gations of the 
government
Pension and 
health care 
expenditure
Future recur-
rent costs of 
public invest-
ment projects
Default of subnational 
government or public or 
private entities
Banking failure
Disaster relief and 
recovery assistance 
including for
Internally displaced 
people
Note: items in blue relate to disaster risk management
INTRODUCTION
Internal displacement is a global phenomenon that affects 
every region and nearly every country around the world. Each 
year, millions of people are forced to leave their homes because 
of violence, conflict, disaster, climate change or other reasons, 
moving to another area within their own country. Conflicts and 
violence led to 11.8 million new internal displacements, and 
disasters to 18.8 million, in 2017.1  
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has for 
the last 20 years been highlighting the damages caused by 
mismanaged displacement on affected people’s rights and 
well-being. Simultaneously, the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has been examining the fiscal 
and economic cost imposed by disasters and climate change at 
all levels from national to global. IDMC partnered with IIASA in 
2018, to produce the first assessments of another consequence 
of the factors which cause people to leave their homes: the 
economic impacts of internal displacement.2 IDMC’s first esti-
mate of the global impact of internal displacement amounted 
to a staggering $13 billion a year.3
This paper presents IIASA’s approach and methodology for esti-
mating the fiscal gap that governments of countries affected by 
internal displacement may face because of future displacement 
crises. This methodology builds upon IIASA’s previous work 
on Catastrophe Simulation modelling (CatSim) and on IDMC’s 
estimates of the economic impacts of internal displacement 
and model of displacement risk in the context of sudden-onset 
disasters.4 One of the main goals of this project is to assist 
budget and development planners to anticipate and prepare 
for contingent liabilities associated with internal displacement. 
An estimate of risk, delivered through an analysis of the fiscal 
gap, is a pre-requisite for making such liabilities explicit within 
budget preparation and development plans.
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AS 
GOVERNMENTS’ CONTINGENT 
LIABILITY
Policies and interventions regarding internal displacement often 
focus on responding to an ongoing crisis and addressing emer-
gency situations. But even when the needs of the people 
affected by these crises are met and responses planned effi-
ciently, internal displacement damages social networks, mental 
and physical health, productivity, wellbeing and welfare. As 
a result, governments and other actors must also work to 
prevent or limit the scale, duration and negative impacts of 
internal displacement.
Preventing and limiting internal displacement’s duration, scale 
and negative impacts requires longer term planning and a 
good understanding of the risk of internal displacement at 
the national level. IDMC developed a risk model that assesses 
the likelihood of future internal displacement associated with 
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The fiscal risk matrix approach (Table 1) distinguishes the 
governments’ direct and explicit, contingent and implicit liabil-
ities. Contingent liabilities arise only when a particular event 
occurs while direct liabilities will occur with certainty. Explicit 
liabilities are recognised by law or contract, while implicit liabil-
ities refer to obligations. Internal displacement and its cost 
qualifies mostly as an implicit liability taken on by a government 
due to its obligation to protect and care for the people within 
its borders.
A risk not prepared for coupled with weak financial resources 
can lead to substantial additional fiscal stress on a state, and 
can eventually reduce the capacity for public finances to fund 
other public investment projects.10 To build fiscal space, a 
pro-active approach should therefore be adopted, for example 
by setting up appropriate risk management and finance meas-
ures based on reliable forecast data. 
Historically, countries have planned for contingent liabilities 
and financed losses in a rather ad-hoc manner, for example 
using ex-post sources, such as diverting money from other 
parts of a national budget.11 Escalating levels of losses caused 
by disasters in recent decades have led governments to shift 
towards a more proactive approach: aiming to tackle risks 
before disaster strikes. This involves governments moving 
at least part of their contingent liabilities into their regular 
budgets and using predictive and protective risk instruments, 
such as insurance, to safeguard against serious and lasting 
consequences being caused by necessary expenditure. Such 
approaches are now applied not only at the national level, for 
example Mexico which reinsured its Natural Disaster Fund in 
2006, but also in multinational contexts, such as the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, which provides mutual 
insurance for Caribbean governments. 
One pre-requisite for accounting for internal displacement as 
a contingent liability as part of a government’s budget plan-
ning process is to be able to quantify the risk governments 
are exposed to. Using a methodology developed for disaster 
risk management and focusing on the fiscal resources of a 
country, this paper presents an analysis of the countries most 
vulnerable to fiscal risk associated with the costs of future 
internal displacement. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The methodology used in this paper combines estimates of 
the financial risk to which a country is exposed due to internal 
displacement, with an evaluation of the fiscal resilience of the 
government: its ability to access funding such as domestic or 
external savings.
Combining fiscal resilience with probabilistic losses allows 
the assessment of fiscal risk, a lack of government access to 
domestic and foreign savings needed to cover the costs asso-
ciated with internal displacement. The shortfall in finance is 
measured by the fiscal resource gap (Box 1).  
The assessment presented in this paper builds on the CatSim 
modelling approach.13 CatSim was originally developed to 
estimate the fiscal resource gap due to natural disaster risk at 
the national level.14 Fiscal resilience to reduce possible fiscal 
gaps may take into account various financial resources available 
to a country, including ex-post options such as diversion from 
budget or deficit financing, as well as proactive instruments 
such as insurance, reserve funds or contingent credits. Table 
2 provides an overview of measures that were incorporated 
in the modelling approach. 
Budget diversion represents the amount of funding from 
the central government’s budget available to be re-directed 
towards disaster recovery. It is calculated using a two step 
process. The first step is to determine whether the govern-
ment has a deficit or surplus in its budget. This is estimated 
by comparing revenues and expenditures. CatSim estimates 
use the latest year data available from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. If expenditures exceed revenue by 
BOX 1: CALCULATING THE FISCAL 
RESOURCE GAP12
The monetary cost distribution for the government is 
labelled F. We will also call the government’s instruments 
available to cover these costs ’k’. When an event occurs, 
some or all of the instruments are used to finance asso-
ciated losses.
In the simplest case, one can assume that the finance 
instruments are ranked in a  strict preference order, repre-
sented by an appropriate resource vector, in the following 
way: the first instrument (with given monetary resources) 
is preferred before all other instruments until it is fully 
depleted (x1), afterwards the second instrument (with given 
resources) is preferred before all others until it, too, is 
completely exhausted (x2), and so on.
The sum of all feasible instruments up to their full deple-
tion is the maximum monetary amount available for a 
loss event. The loss financing scheme for an event with a 
return period of 1/y (this return period means that for a 100 
year event ‘y’ would be 0.01) is the solution of depleting 
all resources in the respective order till the losses F-1(1-y) 
are fully covered. 
The smallest return period of the event where losses 
cannot be fully financed even if all resources are used (i.e. 
the return period that satisfies the equation F-1(1-ygap)) is 
called the fiscal resource gap year event or simply the fiscal 
resource gap (1/ygap).  
All return periods larger than the fiscal resource gap will 
be associated with losses the government cannot finance 
given its current financial resources.
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more than five per cent, it is assumed that the government will 
be unable to divert funding into recovery. However, if there is a 
surplus or a smaller deficit, it is assumed that the government 
will be able to divert a portion, estimated here at ten per cent 
of total revenue, towards relief.
table 2: Overview of fiscal resilience source baseline as-
sessment for the modelling approach15
Measure Description
Ex-post:
Budget diversion Maximum diversion is a fixed 
percentage of revenue
Multilateral 
financing insti-
tutions / Interna-
tional borrowing
Constrained by external debt 
sustainability indicator credit 
buffer
Ex-ante:
Reserve funds Case specific. Up to now only 
a few such instruments are 
in place for financing losses.  
Most of them are targeted 
for immediate help after a 
disaster, which is usually only a 
fraction of the total costs. 
Sovereign insur-
ance
Catastrophe 
bonds
There is also an estimate of how much a government would be 
able to borrow on international markets and from multilateral 
financing institutions (MFIs). Calculation of this value is based on 
numerous factors, which combine to affect the total available 
funding. The initial assumption is that a country cannot finance 
disaster losses past a point at which its debt as a percentage 
of exports reaches a value higher than 150 per cent. This value 
represents the point at which the country would be classified as 
a highly-indebted poor country and finding additional funding 
on open markets would be extremely difficult, due to the 
extremely high perceived risk to borrowers. Other determinants 
to this value include the country’s classification as eligible for 
an International Development Association or International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan, guaranteed 
by the World Bank, which may allow them to receive loans at 
concessional rates. For international borrowing, the country’s 
debt rating has a high influence on the conditions of financing, 
and affects the amount of funding available. This rating is a 
major determinant for loan interest, amortisation, and grace 
periods for repaying interest and principal. For exact calculation 
of the first order estimate of this a loan package needs to be 
created which divides funding needs evenly between MFIs and 
international borrowing rates. These rates are determined by 
the country’s national debt rating, whether it is eligible for an 
International Development Association or International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development loan, as well as current 
interest rates. After determining the average properties for the 
loan package (based on the mean of the two interest rates, 
amortisation times, and grace periods) one calculates how 
much the country can borrow and remain under the initial 
limit of 150 per cent present value debt to export ratio. This 
is data intensive and if insufficient data is available, Standard 
Drawing Rights are used as a proxy. They are taken from the 
International Monetary Fund database and also serve as an 
upper limit. 
The CatSim approach as discussed above was originally devel-
oped for direct large scale losses at the national level and had 
to be further adapted for internal displacement costs. First, it is 
assumed that all the respective costs of internal displacement 
have to be borne by the government. Secondly, if internal 
displacement is due to sudden onset disaster events one must 
assume there will be additional direct losses the government is 
responsible to finance. Consequently, not all available resources 
can be used to respond to internal displacement. We therefore 
assume that only half of the total amount of resources available 
can be actually used for internal displacement costs. Given 
the high financial stress a government experiences after large 
disaster events, this is an optimistic assumption. Finally, we will 
not focus on ex-ante measures here, as these means to address 
internal displacement risk are rarely in place. 
Internal displacement risk associated with disasters is expressed 
as the probable maximum loss, in $ million, for an event likely 
to occur every 20, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1,000 and 1,500 years. 
Events likely to occur more frequently are less intense and 
lead to less internal displacement risk. Risk is estimated at the 
national level for each type of hazard including earthquake, 
wind, tsunamis, floods and storms. A multi-hazard loss curve 
can also be produced for each country. 
Fiscal risk is calculated by combining the direct multi-hazard 
loss curve with the government’s maximum fiscal capacity, to 
estimate the fiscal resource gap. This is defined as the event 
return period after which the government will no longer be 
able to finance all the losses it is responsible for. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This paper estimates the event return period, after which 
governments of 188 countries will no longer be able to cover 
the costs associated with internal displacement risk in the 
context of sudden onset disasters. For illustration purposes 
we give two examples.
In Yemen, an earthquake of a magnitude likely to occur every 
10 years on average, would lead to around 15,000 people 
being displaced. Using the average economic impact per 
displaced person recorded by IDMC at $310 a year, the associ-
ated financial burden would be around $4.65 million per year 
of displacement. This estimate would be reduced if people are 
able to return home before one year, and expanded if they 
remain displaced for a longer period.
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table 3: Costs associated with internal displacement risk 
for five hazards per year (in $ million) for different return 
year events in Bangladesh and Yemen
Event return 
period
Bangladesh Yemen
2 5 1
5 273 2
10 1,023 4
25 2,506 52
50 4,060 89
100 5,901 132
250 8,013 234
500 10,032 353
1,000 12,484 521
Using similar calculations for all five hazard types and all return 
periods, the corresponding costs were used as an input to the 
modified CatSim model and connected with each country’s 
fiscal resilience estimates. Table 3 illustrates these calculations 
for Bangladesh and Yemen. For each event return period, that 
is to say the period after which an event of a given intensity is 
likely to reoccur on average, the corresponding costs associated 
with internal displacement are expressed in $million per year 
of displacement. In Bangladesh, an event that is likely to occur 
every 50 years on average has an economic impact associated 
with internal displacement of nearly $4.1 billion per year. In 
Yemen, an event that is likely to occur once per century would 
result in an economic impact associated with internal displace-
ment of around $132 million per year.
In Bangladesh, the estimated possible amount able to be 
diverted from other budget areas is up to $339 million and 
the estimated credit buffer is up to $675 million, adding up to 
slightly more than $1 billion of fiscal resilience. This threshold 
is reached for events with a return period of around ten years. 
This means that Bangladesh is likely to be unable to cover the 
costs associated with internal displacement in the context of 
events that occur every ten years, on average. 
For Yemen, there is no possibility for any diversion of budget 
and the credit buffer is small due to the state’s high levels of 
debt. The maximum is estimated at $35 million. The model 
however shows that the country should be able to cover the 
costs associated with internal displacement in the context of 
disasters with a return period of up to 17 years. Beyond this 
return period, for events that occur every 20 years for instance, 
the government will need support to cope with the economic 
impacts of internal displacement. 
Results for another 186 countries are presented at the end of 
this paper. The baseline estimate of average cost per displaced 
person anywhere on Earth was set at $310. Figure 1 illustrates 
the results in a map on which, the countries for which the fiscal 
resource gap is the lowest, are coloured red. These countries 
are likely to reach the limits of their ability to cope with the 
economic impacts of internal displacement sooner, and more 
often, than the next most financially vulnerable countries, 
which are coloured orange. The most financially resilient coun-
tries are those coloured the darkest blue. Countries in low and 
middle income groups characterised by significant hazard risk 
show the highest fiscal vulnerability. 
figure 1: Global map of fiscal resource gaps linked with the economic impacts of internal displacement
5
FINAL REMARKS
The approach presented in this paper demonstrates the infor-
mational value of using a risk-based model to support better 
budgeting at the national level, and better planning of human-
itarian and development aid for managing and reducing the 
burdens from internal displacement in the aftermath of disas-
ters associated to natural hazards.
The countries most at risk of being unable to counter the 
economic impacts of internal displacement in the short and 
medium term are precisely those already struggling with lower 
levels of development while being exposed to significant risk 
associated with natural hazards. 
A number of caveats should be considered. The estimates 
presented in this paper are a first step and will be refined with 
more precise and comprehensive data on internal displacement 
risk, the financial resources available to governments and the 
economic impacts of internal displacement. The economic 
impact estimates used here measure some of the costs and 
losses associated with internal displacement’s consequences 
on health, education, housing, income and security. They do 
not account for longer term or less direct effects, such as, 
for instance, the reduced consumption of families unable to 
work while they are displaced. For this reason, they should be 
considered underestimates.
Fiscal resource gaps only consider the economic impacts of 
internal displacement, not of the disaster itself, such as housing 
or infrastructure destruction. Adding these would mean the 
depletion of governments budgets even sooner than estimated 
here. Finally, this model only accounts for internal displacement 
risk in the context of sudden-onset disasters. Internal displace-
ment in the context of conflict is also more likely to affect 
low and middle income countries, increasing the financial 
burden they face beyond the results presented in this paper. 
Displacement linked with climate change and environmental 
degradation is another risk that has yet to be accounted for. 
Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
Afghanistan 7
Albania 1000
Algeria 1000
Angola 1000
Antigua and Barbuda 3
Argentina 1000
Armenia 250
Australia 1000
Austria 1000
Azerbaijan 1000
Bahamas, The 33
Bahrain 1000
Bangladesh 10
Barbados 813
Belarus 1000
Belgium 1000
Belize 51
Benin 61
Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
Bhutan 17
Bolivia 204
Bosnia and Herzego-
vina
260
Botswana 1000
Brazil 1000
Brunei Darussalam 1000
Bulgaria 1000
Burkina Faso 7
Burundi 6
Cabo Verde 112
Cambodia 6
Cameroon 11
Canada 1000
Central African 
Republic
11
Chad 2
Chile 1000
Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
China 1000
Colombia 388
Comoros 455
Congo, Dem. Rep. 10
Congo, Rep. 108
Costa Rica 1000
Cote d’Ivoire 1000
Croatia 1000
Cyprus 1000
Czech Republic 1000
Denmark 1000
Djibouti 54
Dominica 6
Dominican Republic 66
Ecuador 3
Egypt, Arab Rep. 410
El Salvador 1000
Equatorial Guinea 1000
 | Annex: Country fiscal risk from displacement expressed as Fiscal resource Gap 
Return period Event
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Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
Eritrea 11
Estonia 1000
Eswatini 1000
Ethiopia 9
Fiji 345
Finland 1000
France 1000
Gabon 1000
Gambia, The 22
Georgia 1000
Germany 1000
Ghana 15
Greece 1000
Grenada 36
Guatemala 239
Guinea 42
Guinea-Bissau 1000
Guyana 7
Haiti 11
Honduras 35
Hungary 1000
Iceland 1000
India 32
Indonesia 508
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1000
Iraq 11
Ireland 1000
Israel 1000
Italy 1000
Jamaica 142
Japan 1000
Jordan 1000
Kazakhstan 1000
Kenya 39
Kiribati 1000
Korea, Rep. 1000
Kuwait 1000
Kyrgyz Republic 68
Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
Lao PDR 6
Latvia 1000
Lebanon 1000
Lesotho 368
Liberia 368
Libya 1000
Lithuania 1000
Luxembourg 1000
Macao SAR, China 1000
Macedonia, FYR 1000
Madagascar 3
Malawi 3
Malaysia 1000
Maldives 1000
Mali 13
Malta 1000
Marshall Islands 1000
Mauritania 5
Mauritius 1000
Mexico 1000
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 137
Moldova 26
Mongolia 1000
Montenegro 730
Morocco 1000
Mozambique 11
Myanmar 4
Namibia 1000
Nepal 10
Netherlands 1000
New Zealand 1000
Nicaragua 148
Niger 9
Nigeria 86
Norway 1000
Oman 1000
Pakistan 14
Palau 51
Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
Panama 1000
Papua New Guinea 16
Paraguay 357
Peru 667
Philippines 83
Poland 1000
Portugal 1000
Qatar 1000
Romania 1000
Russian Federation 1000
Rwanda 21
Samoa 34
San Marino 1000
Sao Tome and Principe 270
Saudi Arabia 1000
Senegal 1000
Serbia 37
Seychelles 1000
Sierra Leone 84
Singapore 1000
Slovak Republic 1000
Slovenia 1000
Solomon Islands 6
Somalia 8
South Africa 1000
South Sudan 5
Spain 1000
Sri Lanka 385
St. Kitts and Nevis 35
St. Lucia 27
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
13
Sudan 12
Suriname 171
Sweden 1000
Switzerland 1000
Syrian Arab Republic 253
7
IIASA  
Schloßpl. 1 
2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
www.iiasa.ac.at 
+43 22 36 80 70 
inf@iiasa.ac.at
Cover photo: IDP camp run 
by the Nigerian government, 
Maiduguri. Photo: NRC/
Beate Simarud, December 
2018
Authors 
Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler, 
Reinhard Mechler 
hochrain@iiasa.ac.at
IDMC contact 
Christelle Cazabat 
Researcher 
christelle.cazabat@idmc.ch
IDMC 
NRC, 3 rue de Varembé 
1202 Geneva, Switzerland 
www.internal-displacement.org 
+41 22 552 3600 
info@idmc.ch
 | NOTES
1. IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018, May 2018. 
2. IDMC and IIASA, The Ripple Effect: conceptual framework, June 
2018. 
3. IDMC, Unveiling the cost of internal displacement, February 2019.
4. Hochrainer-Stigler, S, Mechler, R. and Mochizuki, J., A risk man-
agement tool for tackling country-wide contingent disasters: A 
case study on Madagascar, Environmental Modelling & Software, 
72: 44-55, 2015.
5. IDMC, Global Displacement Risk Model, 2017.
6. IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018, May 2018.
7. Grossi, P. and Kunreuther, H., Catastrophe modeling: A new ap-
proach to managing risk, pp. 23-42. Springer, Boston, 2005.
8. IDMC, Unveiling the cost of internal displacement, February 2019.
9. Mechler, R. and Hochrainer-Stigler, S., Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Man-
aging Sovereign Disaster Risk, Journal of Natural Resources Policy 
Research, 6(1): 93-100, 2014.
10. Mechler, R. and Hochrainer-Stigler, S., Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Man-
aging Sovereign Disaster Risk, Journal of Natural Resources Policy 
Research, 6(1): 93-100, 2014.
Country Fiscal 
Resource 
Gap
Tajikistan 9
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Thailand 1000
Timor-Leste 282
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Tunisia 1000
Turkey 1000
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Tuvalu 1000
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